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Confronting Globalization Through Social Reform in East and 
Southeast Asia1
 
Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt2
 
Abstract 
The paper considers the debate about social welfare policy and labor market policy 
from a comparative political economy perspective by first focusing on the political 
and ideological content of the controversy on the issue of attitudes toward 
entitlements; second by exploring the  impact of existing social welfare policies in 
Southeast Asia compared with other regions; thirdly it explores the class nexus 
between labor organizations approach to social policy and the relationship with 
neoliberal labor market regulations which focus on flexible labor markets, and 
finally the struggle for social reform is presented as one important type of 
resistance against globalization and as a way our of the crisis. 
 
Introduction 
In 1997 the economic miracle in Asia came to an end. What many academics (Bello 
and Rosenfeld 1990; Schmidt 1997) had known for years became manifest in an 
economic and social crisis which soon spread into pluralities of crises rivaling the 
public debt crisis in Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s, and the aftermath of the 
Great Depression. In fact, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and Korea saw more than 
100 billion $ fleeing the countries with massive social, economic and political 
consequences, and many observers even from the International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs) changed their vocabulary and began talking about recession or 
even depression. 
 
Although the underlying reason for what caused the crises and its subsequent 
impact and consequences begs a number of queries, and although we already do 
                                            
1Prepared for the International Studies Association 42dn Annual Convention 20-24 February 
2001, Chicago AInternational Relations and the New Inequality. Power, Wealth, and the 
Transformation of Global Society at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century@. To be presented 
at the Panel A Globalization and the Politics of Resistance@. 
2Associate Professor, Research Center on Development and International Relations, Aalborg 
University, Fibigerstraede 2, 9220 Aalborg East, Denmark. Tel. +45 96358404, Fax. +45 
98153298 Email. jds@ihis.aau.dk, Website. www.ihis.aau.dk/development 
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have multiple of writings and explanations, one pertinent question stands out: Why 
didn´t the East and Southeast Asian policy-elites, their constituencies, and domestic 
and foreign policy advisors prepare the ground for the crisis and related to this why 
was there an absence of even a minimum social security net, which could have 
contributed to a less dramatic outcome? At least in short-term perspective there was 
a rapid growth of unemployment and poverty following in the footsteps of the 
crisis. In the longer perspective the crisis has led the dissolution of the socalled 
AEast Asian miracle@, and what some termed the ACapitalist Developmental State@ 
(CDS) based on a peculiar mix between non-state provided social welfare, hyper-
globalization abroad through classical dependency on the US market, and 
>command capitalism= in the domestic context. Once held up by the multilateral 
agencies as a model for world capitalism (World Bank 1993), the crisis prone 
economies are now shown to the world as deficient because of structural 
distortions. As stressed by the first managing Director of the IMF, Stanley Fischer, 
AIt is striking that models run out of string at some point. Communism worked very 
well for thirty or forty years and then started collapsing. Crony capitalism delivered 
for a long time in Asia but that interlocking nexus of banks, governments, 
corporations became quite rotten and it is rotten in the countries in crisis and they 
have to be reformed A likewise the Managing Director Michel Camdessus who also 
advocates international speculative capital had this comment: AIt would be a 
mistake to blame hedge funds or other market participants for the turmoil in 
Asia...Turbulence in the market is only a symptom of more serious underlying 
problems which are now being addressed in many countries@ (Fischer/Camdessus 
1998 cf. Jayasuriya and Rosser 1999: 6). The crisis is viewed as the determining 
proof that no alternative to the neoliberal Anglo-Saxon type of capitalism ever 
existed, and that privatized and individualized non-universal social welfare is the 
only true way. 
 
There are several reasons for this high degree of interest in this crisis. One is the 
sheer unexpectedness and magnitude of the crisis that struck a set of countries long 
considered to be friends of the Washington Consensus,3 and the fact that foreign 
creditors needed an assurance that Athe loans they had made to the bankrupt finance 
companies, local banks and local enterprises would be guaranteed by the 
government, on the grounds that not compensating the creditors would provoke 
more capital flight and further reduce [the economies] attractiveness as an 
                                            
3The Washington Consensus refers to the neo-liberal policy coming out of close collaboration 
between the IMF and the World Bank under guidance/supervision by the US Treasury. The 
consensus was based on a set of policies including financial sector liberalization, privatization of 
state-owned enterprises, fiscal discipline, and trade, exchange rate and foreign investment 
deregulation. What is of interest here, however, is the broader consensus in Washington that the 
capital account should be liberalized and the fact that key sectors of the public sector should be 
deregulated and privatized. This includes social welfare, but quite peculiarly not the labor market 
 per se. 
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investment site. This was, as the logicians say, the reductio ad absurdum of the 
thinking that had dominated [the friends of the Washington Consensus] for more 
than a decade@ (Bello 1998: 17). No matter how one interprets this situation, which 
might indeed with some irony be termed Aa major market failure@, subsequent loans 
from the IMF went to repay the private sector´s foreign creditors, who refused to be 
penalized by the market for bad investments.4 However, this is not what is 
interesting here, but rather the new convergence between Third way social 
democratic intellectuals who together with the IMF, the World Bank and OECD 
would like the CDS reformed and transformed through Russian type shock-therapy 
to converge with the neoliberal globalization model.  
 
The IMF (together with the Fed) put oil on the fire, and the World Bank, UNDP, 
ILO and others came with the fire extinguishers and suddenly called for social 
safety nets in Asia to prevent social unrest and disastrous social consequences (IHT 
April 16, 1998; ILO 1998). Indeed the World Bank itself in its 1999 report concurs 
about the former >free market showcase for the Third World=:  AEast Asia´s crisis is 
best seen as a story of rapid growth built on incomplete foundations, which was left 
exposed to winds of the international capital markets. Now that the financial 
earthquake has occurred, it will have to rebuild its success on new foundations in its 
trade competitiveness@ (World Bank 1999: 16). AGood governance@5 is the new 
buzzword, and  flexible labor markets and a renewed emphasis by the World Bank 
on safety nets, institution building and civil society denotes that the IMF and the 
World Bank maybe differ in their interpretations and recommendations, although it 
is not difficult to discern what is spin doctor advice and without any real policy 
change. The Anew@ strategies are emphasizing Aan individual=s responsibility to 
insure against the increased risks and uncertainties of globalization, rather than one 
that puts emphasis on governmental responsibilities to pool risks, universalize 
provision and regulate the economy (UNRISD 2000: 9).  
 
In a certain sense, the change of emphasis Aparallels the attempts by Blair and 
Clinton to carve out a Third Way between the paths of Thatcherite economic 
liberalism and old-fashioned bureaucratic interventionism through a greater 
articulation of the role of the state as a facilitator of economic reform@ (Jayasuriya 
and Rosser 1999: 11), and can be denoted as the new Washington consensus.  An 
interesting U-turn in terms of policy priorities, but also an unclear concept which 
has caused a great deal of disagreement among European social democratic leaders 
and therefore it must be dealt with in careful way. For instance it is not clear 
whether the World Bank still holds the view that globalization of production is 
                                            
4Banks from the EU countries were the largest creditors in East Asia $106 billion, Japanese banks 
$68 billion, while U.S. banks only accounted for $ 18 billion (IHT April 14, 2000). 
5In donor parlance meaning transparency, open accounts, opening the market for Western capital, 
consultancy, and all kinds of penetrations - a buzzword for new imperialism.  
 
 3 
expanding international trade and more trade will mean more employment 
opportunities. Or whether the dictum still holds true regarding how the Bank 
comments the growing Afears that increased international trade and investment and 
less state intervention will hurt employment are mainly baseless@ (World Bank 
1995: 60). This advice was followed by most countries in East and Southeast Asia 
and together with the premature liberalization and deregulation of the financial 
sectors those were fundamentally the main causes for the crisis, and it is therefore 
of interest to know whether this is still the case or not?6 One impact of this 
pragmatic and non-ideological Aadvice@ can be discerned in the basic attitude of the 
region´s policy elite towards social welfare and was summarized in a pre-crisis 
editorial in the Asiaweek: ALesson No.1. is that government handouts do not 
alleviate the underlying causes of income disparity. No.2: attempts to redress such 
gaps through taxation and welfare spending end up alienating the rich and 
fostering a debilitating dependence among the poor. Lesson No. 3: nations running 
chronic deficits lose their international credibility. Their competitiveness erodes, 
and global investors punish them by refusing to buy bonds issues by their 
governments unless they offer very high interest rates@ (Asiaweek 26 January, 
1996: 19 cf. Ramesh 2000b: 194).  Whether the unclear and blurred discourse of 
IFI´s represents new priorities or are just rethorics remain to be seen, but it is a fact 
that their Aone size fits all@ medicine is creating social havoc, unevenness, and 
instability in the societies concerned. 
 
The countries of East and Southeast Asia were hit differently by the crisis. Some 
were seriously affected whereas others appear to have escaped rather lightly. This is 
a clear indication of the fact that the countries of the region never represented or 
followed one development model.  Therefore, a rethinking of the crisis should also 
be a rethinking of the East Asian model and relatedly it involves a discussion about 
the role of social and labor policies versus flexibility both by theoretical, historical 
and empirical analysis. One impact of this rethinking is seen in the post-
Washington consensus mentioned above where social safety nets suddenly became 
important in World Bank parlance. The paradigm relies on careful means-tested 
targeting of social expenditures and a neoliberal market based social safety net 
thought to enable social cohesion and social capital, but in reality the purpose is to 
foster smooth structural adjustment without creating chaos in the social fabric and 
                                            
6For an interesting account, see Stiglitz who notes that Athe U.S. Treasury Department pushed 
liberalization in Korea in 1993 over the opposition of the Council of Economic Advisers. 
Treasury won the internal White House battle, but Korea, and the world, paid the price@ (Stiglitz 
17 April, 2000). 
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prevent  workers uprise and mobilization against hard won social and human rights. 
 
This post-Washington Consensus might be interpreted as a boomerang for East 
Asian policymaker. For years, the regions technocrats cum bureaucrats, politicians 
and business executives looking at the expensive welfare states, regulatory 
structures and redistributive tax policies that developed in Scandinavia, had 
proclaimed the necessity of  following a different developmental path.  
 
In a sense the main economic problems, before and now, of the non-welfare states 
in East and Southeast Asia depend on their position in the world economy. 
Although there were pre-crisis embryonic welfare constructions they were 
paradoxically both globally unique and hybrids of existing welfare states. With the 
emphasis on familialism and aversion to public social services, it remains a paradox 
that in a comparative framework with Scandinavia, Continental Europe and the 
Anglo-Saxon countries, East Asia´s social security arrangements lagged far behind 
its economic achievements (Esping-Andersen 1996: 9-10, 21, 23).  
 
Moving the focus to Southeast Asia the discourse of social welfare echoes the 
Asiaweek editorial cited above and thus closely followed the IFI´s neoliberal 
ideology which is essentially a matter of identifying needs, solve problems and 
create opportunities at the individual level. The causes behind the needs for support 
are believed to rest overwhelmingly in individuals and subcultural defects and 
dispositions. Responsibility is deflected from states and national economic, 
administrative and legal organizations to individuals and groups. Little or no 
attention is paid to the interacting consequences of economic and social change for 
families, employment, taxation, housing, social security and public services. 
Laissez-faire individualism and the legitimating of discrimination are in fact the 
intellectual sources of this tradition. 
 
This particular version of social welfare is in practice closely based on theories 
about social philanthropy. It is difficult to discern anything specifically resembling 
<Asian values= as claimed by several leading politicians in this context, except for 
the fact that it rests on a particular ideology which is used as a repressive tool to 
discipline labor's demands for social security and in general demands of the 
workforce which could humanize and socialize work and living conditions and 
economic relations. 
 
As the above has suggested, the debate about social and cultural values, can be used 
for various political purposes according to ideology and the current political 
expediency. Singapore=s philosophy regarding social security discourages any kind 
of system akin to the European model. To its leaders, it is important that 
Singaporeans do not lean on social security, be spoiled and become Asoft@. The 
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hypocrisy is profound, when taking into consideration the fact that Singapore is 
probably the first high-income country in the world which attempts to provide 
social security while rejecting the main foundations of the welfare state. This is 
done through a system of individual provisions, rejection of social insurance, and 
an extremely limited public assistance system based on the Poor Law tradition 
(Asher 1996: 4-5). This is a variant of the Anglo-Saxon subordination of social 
issues to Abusiness as usual@ which projects a distorted and false picture of East and 
Southeast Asian societies. These are on the one hand portrayed to be characterized 
by low rates of government spending, strong family ties and on the other by a 
philanthropic entrepreneurial spirit whereby the owners of productive capital fulfill 
a social function as the benefactors who complement the family, as providers of 
work, shelter and medicine in case of illness, unemployment or marginalization of 
workers. In fact, these values are very close to those known in Victorian England. 
 
The political and ideological content of the controversy on the issue of 
attitudes toward entitlements 
Comparative political economists have developed different arguments regarding the 
determinants of social policies. One type of argument points to the fact that social 
welfare policies convergences due to an underlying logic of industrialism, and 
another see them as state responses to the social requirements of capitalism. A third 
view approaches the problematique from quite another angle by suggesting that the 
survival of market-based capitalism is essentially based on a Keynesian strategy 
which saves it from self-destruction (Galbraith 1997: 5). The necessary prerequisite 
is a social compact between labor and capital. This type of argument is based on 
two readings of the Keynesian social welfare state. One sees it as a tool of 
compromise when the foundation of capitalism is at stake like during and after the 
crisis in of the 1930s and post WW II. The second reading regards the socio-
economic dimension (i.e. the surplus absorption); by functioning as a demand 
primer, including social expenditures, Keynesian macroeconomics alleviate the 
tendency towards stagnation (Schmidt & Hersh 2000: 8). Nonetheless, those 
readings form the very basics of Scandinavian corporatism - where the state is 
projected to be the arbiter between labor and capital. 
 
This understanding is closely related to the important debate regarding the past and 
present of the way ties to the world economy, patterns of geopolitical and 
geoeconomic competition, and processes of transnational cultures, ideologies and 
policy discourses have influenced social policies. The impact of the external 
determinants on social policy agendas and labor market policies cannot stand alone, 
but should be pared with an understanding of the impact of states on social and 
labor market policymaking. 
 
These theoretical concerns make the recourse to history important - and broadly 
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speaking, the neoliberal prescriptions on social and labor market policies cannot be 
based on the past record. History provides no clear examples of laissez-faire 
policies which resulted in high wage economies capable of supporting widely 
dispersed welfare benefits for a large population. Essentially what has happened is 
what Bienefeld (1993: 31) once called the disarming of the state. Financial 
deregulation is a route to an increasingly polarized society in which the majority 
will suffer sustained welfare losses and in which the goal of a more humane, caring 
and leisure-oriented society will soon be dismissed as utopia. 
 
In this regard the question which social sciences faces in view of globalization is 
whether the process will result in greater social welfare or whether globalization 
serves to reduce the social dimension of twentieth century capitalism. This 
problematique has gained special significance in the context of the breakdown of 
East Asian authoritarian capitalism. Will an evolution towards more democracy 
open the way to a greater contest over the economic surplus/social product? How 
will the political systems absorb the demands of the social classes at a time when 
adjustment to the conditionalities imposed by the IFIs goes in the direction of the 
dismantling of the CDS?7
 
One consequence of the effects of globalization and neoliberal hegemony has been 
the ideologization of the role of the state in East Asia and implicitly the region=s 
social welfare systems. Neoconservatives in Europe, the United States and East 
Asia are seemingly in convergence when they point to the importance of culturally-
bound social values such as hard work, discipline, enterprise, family, thrift, 
responsibility and respect for authority. Thus, the Weberian interpretation of 
European capitalism as a product of Protestantism has been recycled to explain the 
socalled East Asian miracle in terms of a specific Confucian ethic. In fact a certain 
ideological convergence has made its appearance despite the much publicized 
divergences. Yet one of the results of economic growth and the emergence of  East 
Asian self-confidence was based on the fact that  "the preconditions for new 
political alliances spanning 'East' and 'West' are emerging," and "opponents of 
liberalism and social democracy, both inside and outside 'Asia', are drawing on each 
others' arguments and views with a growing synergy" (Rodan 1995: 2).  What is 
new in this regard is the emerging alliance between liberals and conservatives on 
the particular important aspect of defending the rights of capital and business 
against perceived threats from labor and trade unions, and their perception of the 
                                            
7In a recent report UNRISD (2000: 2-6) sets out four ways how globalization impacts and affects 
national-level social policy in the North: 1) It sets welfare states in competition with each other; 
2) raises issues of social redistribution, social regulation and social empowerment to a regional 
and global level; it generates a global discourse within and among global actors on the future of 
national and supranational social policy; and finally it creates a global market in welfare 
providers. While in the South it has: 1) Generated severe indebtedness; 2) threatened assets and 
standards; 3) segmented social policy; 4) created zones of exclusion. 
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role of the state in terms of entitlements seems to move in a >Third way= direction. 
 
Presumed models of small government, company/corporate welfare systems and 
strong familial traditions (inside/outside distinctions, patriarchal authority, strict 
gender role separation and female subordination) are being used to argue against 
public social welfare expenditures. Indeed, Mahathir Mohamad echoes views of 
European conservatives when he shows distaste for socalled Western values and at 
the same time strongly emphasizes "the need to preserve the family unit, sexual 
propriety and respect for elders" (FEER 20 August, 1992: 18). The Malaysian 
government=s official aim is to establish a caring society and a caring culture: a 
social system in which society will come before self: in which the welfare of the 
people will revolve, not around the state or the individual, but around a strong and 
resilient family system (Awang 1993: 185).  In Japan, the conservatives seek to 
reinvigorate Confucian familialism in order to deal with problems of the rapidly 
ageing population. These examples closely parallel Christian Democratic policy in 
much of Europe, and for basically the same reason they are unlikely to be effective 
(Esping-Andersen 1996: .24). Also proponents of the Third Way see social security 
arrangements like the provident fund mechanism found in Southeast Asia as one 
which could be recycled into Blair´s stakeholder society, and the World Bank has 
recommended this >reverse Orientalism= (White, Goodman and Kwon 1997) 
insurance model as one of three pillars essential for >averting the old age crisis= 
(Ramesh 2000a: 3). 
 
Beneath the surface of these ideological divergences and convergences toward 
social welfare the bottom line of the debate is that social security issues are 
assuming greater importance. It is being realized that the maldistribution of wealth 
and increasing vulnerability of modernizing social systems in East and Southeast 
Asia can potentially lead to unrest and instability. It seems clear that ideologic 
positions of social welfare have become a factor which shape internal and external 
policy in various directions depending on the social circumstances. 
 
The sudden and massive shift in sentiments towards these countries on the part of 
international financial markets, the relative ineffectiveness of efforts so far to 
stabilize markets, and the general failure on the part of governments, international 
organizations and markets to anticipate the crisis, pose new and difficult problems. 
They raise critical issues of national and international public policy in the context 
of growing globalization of financial markets. Foremost among these issues is the 
question of what can be done to avert or reduce the likelihood of similar crises in 
the future (ILO 1998: 8).  
 
From Developmental State to Re-regulation 
Before the onset of the crisis in 1997, East and Southeast Asian leaders (including 
 
 8 
Japan) deliberately encouraged economic growth by emphasizing international 
competition through a calculated export-led strategy and avoidance of social 
welfare programs. This essentially anti-entitlement attitude laid the groundwork for 
a stable societal order based on developmental paternalism and a specific set of 
social values (Deyo 1989). Policy-making in this regard promoted a political 
culture which claimed that public welfare reduces productivity. Despite very high 
economic growth rates, some emphasis has been devoted to education and to a 
lesser extent health. Social welfare expenditures were primarily located in the 
private domain and concentrated on public employees. The explicit purpose of this 
course was to avoid wage increases and neutralize labor and oppositional policy 
groupings either through co-opting, repressing or linking high growth and increases 
in employment opportunities with control by the government. However, historically 
speaking, there have been attempts and pressures from the labor movement for the 
state to adopt and implement social security related legislation and policies. 
 
By putting <politics in command= the CDS in East Asia played an important role in 
the capitalist growth process. The East Asian late industrialization development 
model was based on the implementation of a specific understanding of political 
economy, whereby the state assumed a function in the guidance of the economy 
without disregarding the importance of the market. Government policy-making was 
thus organically tied to the production factors - land, labor and capital - in actively 
creating comparative advantages.  Before the crisis neo-Listian theory enabled a 
clear explanation and provided the definition of the East Asian CDS which had Aa 
role different from that of the Keynesian welfare state in the already advanced 
countries. The Keynesian welfare state serves to restrain market rationality by 
measures to protect groups vulnerable to the consequences of market rationality. By 
contrast the developmentalist state restrains market rationality in order to pursue a 
policy of industrialization per se@ (Hoogvelt 1997: 206). But the export-oriented 
strategy came to an impasse.  During the Cold War the White House offered free 
access to the US market to handful non-communist economies in the region. Today 
competition has become harsh among Asian economies, and not least the Chinese 
shift to a labor-intensive EOI strategy has left the region with a drive downwards on 
prices and profits, and in any case, there is overproduction in almost any productive 
sector in the real economy relative to the decline of outlets on the European and US 
markets. Furthermore, the CDS with its embedded autonomy became its own 
gravedigger. The very success of the developmental state in structuring the 
accumulation of industrial capital changed the nature of relations between private 
capital and the state. As private capital became less dependent on the resources 
provided by the state, the latter=s dominance diminished. The zaibatzus and 
chaebols became the new masters and coupled with resurgent distributional 
demands the elite networks and bureaucratic structures the state became 
transformed into a new type of regulatory institution (Evans 1992; 1995). 
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Already before the crisis, Southeast Asia was subjected to the advice of IFIs to 
reduce state control of the economy and society. The role model has been that 
projected by neoliberalism which in recent years has also attacked the social 
compromise created by the <Welfare State= in the West. The new post-Washington 
Consensus and the Third Way do recognize that the poor, the marginalized and 
those in the informal sector should be targeted, but also new labor market policies 
regarding training, upgrading of qualifications, and linking pension funds to 
savings will according to the new paradigm create more efficient markets and social 
welfare. The point is that Athe real debates in the next decade are not going to be 
about whether there should be safety nets but about the control, management and 
generosity of retirement funding in East Asia. In this sense, the new consensus is an 
attempt to seize the policy agenda in response to a new range of demographic and 
social problems@  (Jayasuriya and Rosser 1999: 16).  The question is whether the 
Anew approach@ resembles well-known neoliberal prescriptions such as advocated 
by Friedrich von Hayek and Milton Friedman who projected three systems of 
welfare: the family, the voluntary sector (charity), and the free market. 
Accordingly, the state's role should be a residual and minimal one, and on very rare 
occasions, should it involve a responsibility limited towards means-tested minimum 
benefits and entitlements. 
 
However, there are also important constraints for a successful implementation of a 
re-regulated neoliberal state in the regions based on Agood governance@ and still 
relying on EOI development: 
 
1) The international environment is not as conducive to export-led growth as it 
has been in the past and there is surplus production in a most any sector in 
the world economy.8
2) It will be difficult to obtain political legitimacy enabling state capacities to 
operate (the past experience weighs on the present). 
3) The market is weakening the propensity of the state to fulfill its function of 
guiding the economy. 
4) The state is being weakened by the loss of revenues through the 
privatization of public property and national enterprises. 
5) The political sphere is in distress and the state does not have the capacity of 
establishing the social arrangement conducive to economic growth. 
6) Furthermore, now states in both East- and Southeast Asia have to cater to 
international multilateralism and goodwill. 
 
                                            
8See the discusion in Xing, Hersh and Schmidt (2001). 
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The real issue is what Ankie Hoogvelt (1997: 113) convincingly argues that there is 
a historical trend towards forms of production organization in which capital no 
longer needs to pay for the reproduction of labor power. At the same time, 
participation in the global marketplace means that the domestic market is no longer 
needed to serve the self-expansion of capital. Jobless growth is what the present 
phase of capitalism is all about. AIt is this process of globalization rather than any 
claimed imbalance in the national accounts between public and private sector 
growth (the fiscal deficit), nor any demographic imbalance (the graying population) 
that is the main reason for the perceived need to shed and restructure the welfare 
state which has become the dominant political project in all advanced countries 
since the 1980s@ (Hoogvelt ibid). Coupled with the fact that there is a Arace to the 
bottom@ in terms of job flight as mentioned at a recent conference for East Asian 
union leaders hosted by the AFL-CIO: AAs soon as we start to organize a union, the 
company threatens to move to Vietnam,@ and it was an unanimous view that 
international regulations are needed to keep companies from moving to low-wage 
economies (Los Angeles Times, February 22, 1998) - the result is that East and 
Southeast Asia appear to be approaching what can be termed classical problems of 
Europe and the United States. The bottomline is that the international context 
through the impact of neoliberal globalization has shifted from a situation where 
unemployment was a conjunctural domestic problem to one where unemployment 
is a real global structural phenomenon and hence a counter-hegemonic force must 
be based on the reconquering of the state and the reinitiating of publicly sanctioned 
social reforms. In this regard, the debate regarding ageing or the socalled 
Ademographic threat@ is merely a policy issue and not an issue which should be left 
for profit oriented management of retirement funding.9   
 
The East Asian miracle has been used to confront oppositional views and directly 
or indirectly it produced an intellectual climate of fear in the West with 
intimidations such as: If Asia rises, the West, or at least its jobs and wages, must 
fall. This big business oriented threat claimed that the problem is "Western 
democracy itself, which runs the danger of ceasing to be a vehicle for delivering the 
services that ordinary people want from the government, and of becoming instead 
an instrument for helping strong lobbies pick tax-payers' pockets. This is a danger 
that developing Asia has been fairly good at avoiding" (The Economist 30 October 
1993: 6).  
 
The OECD has warned that the costly and work-discouraging welfare apparatus in 
the West is beginning to strike at the authority of the democratic system. This 
essentially selffulfilling  argument was echoed in a recent Far Eastern Economic 
Review editorial: "For too long Western rights advocates have tended to equate 
social progress with the growth of a welfare state, measuring commitment by gross 
                                            
9The author would like to thank Ankie Hoogvelt for pinpointing these issues. 
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social spending. If Asia has managed to keep its families intact and its economies 
growing, it is in no small part because countries here have for the most part resisted 
this temptation. The West has shown how slippery the welfare road can be, with 
benefits once granted quickly graduating to special interest status and becoming 
permanent" (FEER June 23, 1994: 5).   
 
Paradoxically, while the welfare state in the West has been critized for being 
patronizing, the philosophy of individual or family responsibility for the provision 
of social security is only possible in the context of a paternalistic form of 
government. It is reflected in the so far successful attempt Ato control the discourse 
on welfare in Singapore, and to treat welfare provisions as essentially privileges to 
be doled out at the discretion of the government in return for gratitude from the 
citizenry@ (Asher 1994: 70).  Apart from the Filipino case, the paternalistic nature 
of state and governance can be extended to other East and Southeast countries as 
well, which is a sign of the convergence mentioned above. 
 
This trend is also being underscored in the West by the growing emphasis by the 
OECD on flexibility and low wages; but what is more important in this context is 
the accompanying guideline according to which high non-wage employment costs, 
such as social security and unemployment insurance, should be reduced. "A 
reduction of the non-wage costs is recommended, especially for lower salaries," and 
governments should implement "lighter less interventionist regulation" (OECD 
Observer 1995: 41). 
 
One comparison of expenditures on social welfare in Western Europe, the United 
States and Japan shows that, "in Europe, the increasing reliance on a reserve army 
of contingent workers reflects the growing concern on the part of corporate 
management that the expensive social net is making their companies less 
competitive on global markets" (Rifkin  1995: 201-202). On average, workers enjoy 
longer paid vacations and work fewer hours besides being 50 percent more 
expensive than either U.S. or Japanese labor. Public spending in Europe is the 
highest and much of it goes to finance social programs to protect and enhance the 
well-being of workers and their families. German social security payments in 1990 
were 25 percent of GDP, while the U.S. spent 15 percent and only 11 percent in 
Japan. The finance of social entitlements required a corporate tax burden in 
Germany which exceeds 60 percent, compared to 52 percent in France, and only 45 
percent in the U.S. Adding up all the expenditures of the welfare state which 
includes costs of taxes, social security, unemployment benefits, pensions, and 
medical insurance - they amount to about 41 percent of the total GDP in Europe, 
compared to 30 percent in the U.S. and Japan. In contrast, in the early 1990s, the 
costs of social security and welfare accounted for less than 5 per cent of total 
expenditure and net lending in Southeast Asia, while an additional 3-5 percent was 
 
 12 
spent on health (Asher 1996: 72). 
 
The above propositions regarding state sanctioned social welfare raise the question 
of how nation-states and policy-makers control the nature and impact of 
globalization probably one of the most pertinent issues on the regional policy 
agenda. It is essentially a matter of how individual states adapt and respond to the 
neoliberal policies of keeping wages below productivity growth and downsizing 
domestic costs which have led to an unstable vicious circle of 'global competitive 
austerity': "Each country reduces domestic demand and adopts an export-oriented 
strategy of dumping its surplus production, for which there are fewer consumers in 
its national economy given the decrease in workers' living standards and 
productivity gains all going to the capitalists, in the world market. This has created 
a global demand crisis and the growth of surplus capacity across the business cycle" 
(Albo 1994: 147).  Furthermore, the convergence between low welfare expenditures 
and export orientation has become part and parcel of the tendency to position 
national economies in the international system. 
 
Stephen Gill has pointed out that "Recent growth in enclave residential 
development, private provision of security, and private insurance and health care 
suggests that access to what were often considered to be public goods under 
socialized provision is now increasingly privatized, individualized, and hierarchical 
in nature. More broadly, there has been a transformation of the socialization of risk 
towards a privatization and individualization of risk assessment and insurance 
provision. Nevertheless, this process is hierarchical: For example, burdens of risk 
are redistributed, marketwise, and individualized (e.g., associated with illness, old 
age, or pensions) as opposed to being fully socialized through collective and public 
provision. (The IMF and the World Bank have recently pressed for the privatization 
of public pension provision, especially in the Third World, to create larger local 
capital markets)" (Gill 1995: 407 and fn.26). Furthermore, globalization 
universalizes the labor market, thereby undermining labor unions and labor 
standards in all countries - this might sound provocative but consider the fact that 
offshore hedge funds deposit holdings now total 7-8 trillion dollars - close to the 
total gross domestic product of the United States. The price is paid by national 
policy-making, social benefits and the coherence of labor markets (UN March, 
1999).10  
 
In the context of socio-economic and political adjustment of neoliberal 
globalization the question is whether East and especially Southeast Asia represents 
another type of welfare regime (a Third Way) with its combination of low state 
social spending, weak labor movements and long working hours or whether each 
country is developing its own contextually grounded type of collective goods model 
                                            
10See UN Development Update http://www.igc.org/globalpolicy/socecon/tncs/taxes99.htm. 
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which doesn´t necessarily contain any resemblances or emulations at all! 
 
Social policy and Labor Policy in Southeast Asia compared with other regions 
Before the crisis, Southeast Asia´s growth strategy necessitated that the demand and 
supply of economic security, of which labour rights, old-age income security, and 
health care are major components should be kept as low as possible. Also, the 
major burden of their provision should be on the individuals and families. The 
resulting economic insecurity, coupled with state control over accumulated 
mandatory savings provided ideal tools for social and political control to the ruling 
elites. That there is a degree of hypocrisy involved here is confirmed by the fact 
that these elites do not need to face such economic insecurity as they have defined-
benefit pension plans for life. Accordingly, the official policy and ideology on 
social welfare does not apply to individual elites= personal plans. 
 
All historical precedents of crises show that it is always a substantial shock to any 
social system. But the effects are amplified in the three most severely affected 
countries (Indonesia, Thailand and Korea) by the absence of a meaningful social 
safety net. Out of three countries, only Korea has an unemployment insurance 
system, which is of recent origin and limited coverage and duration. Systems of 
social assistance were also rudimentary.  The vast majority of displaced workers 
thus had to fend for themselves during the crisis. In addition social expectations had 
been shaped by extensive employment opportunities and this made the shock in the 
labour market all the ruder. AIndeed this combination of sharp and unexpected 
social pain on the one hand, and the lack of collectively provided relief on the 
other, is fertile ground for breeding social unrest @(ILO 1998: 12). The OECD 
member country, Korea saw the number of poor increasing dramatically - i.e. the 
number ultra poor, marginal poor, and near poor more than doubled from 1997 to 
1998 to 3.0 million, 3.3 million, and 4.1 million, respectively (Gazier and Herrera 
2000: 334), while Thailand=s number of poor increased from 11.4 percent in 1996 
to 13 percent in 1998, and Indonesia was hit hardest with an additional 10-12 
million people were pushed into poverty - a number which has manifold increased 
during the past three years to above maybe 50 percent of the working population. 
 
The centrality of the state with regard to capacity and will can be compared by 
looking at central government expenditure on social programs. While there was 
traditionally one social welfare department in Southeast Asia or at least an agency, 
it typically had a very modest budget and no basic-needs mandate. Not surprisingly, 
during the period from 1972 to 1990, the share of central government expenditure 
on 'housing, amenities, social security and welfare' among the Southeast Asian 
countries ranged from a 0.9 percent increase in Malaysia, to a decrease of 1.2 
percent in Thailand, 0.6 percent increase in Indonesia, and a 2 percent drop in the 
Philippines. Placed in the context of comparative Third World development this 
 
 14 
was markedly lower than the 16.2 percent average for middle-income LDCs in 
1985 and also much lower than the average in most of the Latin American and 
South Asian countries. These pre-crisis figures indicate that already a decade ago 
there was a potential conflict over rising living expectations and pressure on the 
delivery of public goods and services (Schmidt 1998: 52). The state-provided social 
security programs in the region, although covering civil servants and military 
personnel, leave large gaps in coverage. At the lowest end is Indonesia, where the 
various schemes cover 9 per cent of the population and 20 per cent of the labor 
force. Malaysia where active contributors to the Central Provident Fund form 20 
per cent of the population and 50 per cent of the labor force. AThose who are 
excluded from statutory schemes are usually those who need public support the 
most: domestic servants, casual workers, seasonal workers and the majority of 
farmers. The anomaly is the result of the governments efforts to keep public 
expenditures on social security down, which leads them to establish programs that 
are partially or fully funded from contributions by employees and/or employers 
(Ramesh 2000b: 178). While those figures show that even within Southeast Asia 
there are differences among countries in terms of expenditures on social welfare,  
they don´t  specify that it is important to understand why the two regions had 
different priorities with regard to the impact of globalization. 
 
In comparing Southeast Asia and East Asia it is worthwhile to emphasize six 
important differences:11
 
1) The level of income equality has been much higher in East Asia than Southeast 
Asia.12
 
2) Public expenditures on education have been much higher in East Asia than 
Southeast Asia especially in terms of targeting higher education. 
 
3) Public expenditures on health are low by any standard, and rely primarily on 
private sector and individual resources. 
 
                                            
11I don´t want to spend to much space here on the social data  as others have done that already. 
See for instance Ramesh with Asher (2000) from where some of the information in 1-6 above has 
been adapted; see also Gough (2000); Goodman, White and Kwon (1998); and Hersh and 
Schmidt (forthcoming). 
12According to the World Wealth Report 1999 from Merill Lynch and Gemini Consulting, 
Southeast Asia=s wealthy managed to increase their collective worth by 10 % year-on-year in 
1998 to $4.4 trillion. Their secret? It´s threefold: They hold much of their assets overseas; when 
the crisis hit they shifted from local currencies to the U.S. dollar, and most importantly, they did 
not panic, but rode out the equity storm. They can look forward to even greater riches: Their 
collective value is predicted to soar 63% from the 1998 figure to $7.2 trillion by 2003 (cf FEER 
June 3, 1999).  
 
 15 
3) Expenditures on social security have been equally low in both cases relative to 
their economic level. 
 
4) Poverty has increased tremendously after the crisis - for instance in Indonesia 
conservative estimates that poverty might be as high as 50 per cent.   
 
5) Statutory social security is being expanded in Korea and Taiwan while Southeast 
Asia seems to be moving in the direction of charity and philanthropy. 
 
6) Southeast Asian countries are increasingly turning to the private sector in the 
provision and/or financing of social programs. 
 
It might be worth repeating that no single East or Southeast Asian welfare state 
exists except in very hybrid forms. In fact, the history of welfare is determined by 
the distinctive institutional matrix of politics in each country (Kwon 1998: 66).13 
What those societies and regions do share is the fact that conservative forces have 
so far dominated the debate regarding social welfare and that labor unions and 
workers in general have not been able to any significant degree to enter the policy 
agenda regarding social policy. This might be interpreted as a specific ideology 
based on an organic understanding of state and society. An ideology which has 
been described as >corporatism without labor=, whereby the state, the 
conglomerates, and the banks worked hand-in-glove, but labor was systematically 
excluded (Cumings 1999: 37). 
 
The reason for this is related to the labor market policies which share the infamous 
doctrine described above across East and Southeast Asia. It is evident that the 
strategies taken have been were based on labor discipline and peaceful industrial 
relations which always are an important prerequisite for EOI development and thus 
demand a semi-authoritarian regime. Thus repression and the marginalization of 
labour has had the consequence that for all countries concerned, except Korea, trade 
unionism has been weak, coopted by the state or company based. On the other 
hand, there are also diverse and growing evidence of militant trade unionism 
sometimes in strong competition with the corporatist-based unions and the state 
sanctioned unions. The key problem has been that political representation by labor 
and other marginalised groups have not been institutionalized in the political arena. 
Historical evidence shows clearly that, this is not a matter of "new politics", but 
related to repression and outlawing of leftist (or even modest social democratic) 
                                            
13Again it is important to consider historical research: There have been several attempts to 
establish a social democratic type of, or even, socialist welfare state in both regions. For instance 
Thailand after the second WW, and Indonesia under Sukarno, tried to implement social reforms 
but were toppled by reactionary forces either with the help of the US, CIA and Pentagon and/or 
other Western colonial masters who wouldn´t allow alternatives.  
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alternatives to the dominant discourse of growth, exports and elite paternalism 
(Schmidt 2000). 
 
During both the early and late phases of EOI labor market policies in the region 
have been rather successful in mobilizing domestic labor resources. Rarely have 
labor posed a significant threat to employers at the local level. In all the countries 
under scrutiny, except the Philippines, the control or elimination of the left went 
hand in hand with an extension of state control over labor activism and the 
incorporation of labor into directly or indirectly state controlled unions. The 
historical background is well known, and it is also well documented that this was 
done with the help and advice of the United States and Great Britain all over the 
region during the Cold War.  The result has been exclusion of organized labor and 
the fact that markets determined wages independent of union interference. Micro-
corporatist unionism and decentralization later on became a strategy to upgrade 
skills and training and encourage labor market flexibility especially in the first-tier 
NIC´s, while in Southeast Asia who was a late-comer in EOI driven industrializa-
tion, there was and still are strong labor controls which basically can be explained 
by the heavy dependence on foreign investment and foreign markets - a problem 
also being enforced upon Korea now. 
 
With affluence, demographic change and greater democratization in Korea, Taiwan 
and to a certain extent Southeast Asia, demands for collective economic and social 
security have been growing. By the late 1980s there was a general increase in fears 
of mass empowerment in the business sectors in Korea and Taiwan and the 
relationship between capital and labor began gradually to bread into zero-sum-
conflicts.  Moreover, the task of controlling the agenda of social policy was 
becoming more difficult because of affluence which provided more choice, and 
because of the information revolution. Today, four years after the financial crisis 
started, the region is in a transition phase searching for new models and new ways 
to cope with new demands both from the IFIs and other international actors and 
institutions, and not least growing demands from within the domestic social fabric 
for increasing entitlements. As such the traditional CDS model of >corporatism 
without labor= is in an acute state of crisis. The spillover effect cannot be 
overestimated as the situation in Korea clearly indicates with important 
repercussions for the rest of the two regions.  
 
Korea has had one of the strongest labor movements in the world, but was not able 
to involve in politics before after 1998, and today, the unions hold the key to 
whether the governments - and the IMF´s - reform program will succeed (Cumings 
1999: 36-7). What is interesting to note is the fact that immediately after the crisis 
the government introduced a public workfare scheme, expanded a temporary non 
contributory means-tested livelihood protection program, and created a social 
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pension scheme for the elderly. Public work was initiated to curb unemployment 
(because the majority didn´t receive any benefits at all) and various initiatives were 
taken in order to fight poverty although the help programs only reached 7 percent 
of the poor (World Bank 2000: 123, 151, 140 and 144). As such more than 437,000 
public works were initiated in the aftermath of the crisis. 
 
With the Aunconditionaly advice@ of the IMF and the World Bank, Korea´s 
government introduced an austerity programme with the typical ingredients and a 
labor market policy based on employment flexibility through the implementation of 
free layoff provisions and determinate term employment in a renewed labor 
legislation which contrasts the pre-crisis policy of high wage flexibility and strict 
employment security. What is interesting is the fact that the employment insurance 
scheme might be seen as a compensation for the unions= acceptance of the new 
market based labor policies (Gazier and Herrera 2000: 336 and 341-342). The 
government also established a Tripartite Commission in January 1998, born as a 
presidential advisory body, which ceased to function in late 2000, because 
representatives of the trade unions walked out. This attempt on neo-corporatist 
policy-making had in fact been discussed since 1990 according to the Korean 
state´s wish to bring about wage restraints and industrial peace.  
 
Although weakened in terms of falling membership the labor movement has shown 
its strength in terms of various types of resistance strategies - for instance the 
number of strikes increased from 78 in 1997 to 129 in 1998 involving more than 
146,065 workers compared with 43,991, respectively (Lee 2000: 170) 
 
Corporatism With Labor 
In a well-known article Walter Korpi presents a general framework for comparing 
social policy strategies in a comparative perspective. The focus is put on the 
distributional arrangements in each society and the key variable is the way in which 
working classes have been incorporated into politics. Welfare is seen in terms of 
pressures from below and as pressures from a particular class (Korpi 1980). He 
found at least five types of working class organization and control in the capitalist 
countries during the post-war period 1946 to 1979. What is of interest to note here 
is that based on Korpi´s data there were great differences between the countries in 
these respects. This might imply that based on historical and empirical evidence 
there are more roads to social welfare than we might expect, and this might also 
provide some credit substance to the argument that East and Southeast Asia consist 
of many different societies and hence different types of working class pressures 
may result in varying social welfare models. A fact, which is confirmed a number 
of studies by Gösta Esping-Andersen who initially described the infamous three 
worlds of welfare, but is now more inclined to talk about four or even five models. 
Esping-Andersen´s definition of social welfare policy as policy designed to help 
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those who suffer from the irregularities of capitalism based on transfer payments 
which help established payments is the most promising because it is broad and 
flexible. 
 
In this connection what is characteristic of the Scandinavian model is that it is 
based on principle of universalism, which strives to keep unemployment at low 
levels, and includes women in the labor force. However, social benefits are 
disbursed to all regardless of social status and not related to the position in the labor 
markets exclusively. It is exactly this aspect which makes it different from the 
German, and the Anglo-Saxon model where the latter is based on the neo-liberal 
principle of means-tested aid meaning that it only helps the socially disadvantaged, 
and thereby leaves itself open to welfare backlash. 
 
Corporatism can be defined as some kind of "natural" organic unity of societies and 
a "natural" division of society into various groups each with its "proper" roles. In 
the literature of political science, it can have fascist or quasi-fascist connotations 
and can also refer to a system of intermediation between interest groups and the 
state based upon peak associations granted a monopoly of representation within 
their sector of society (Schmitter 1979). Furthermore, Peter J. Katzenstein has 
defined a well-known model of political economy he calls "liberal corporatism" 
(Katzenstein 1984, 1985). And, of course, the post-war model of Scandinavian 
corporatism became a rough synonym for the social democratic welfare state. In 
Weir´s and Skockpol=s essay on Keynesian responses to the Great Depression they 
note that Sweden and the United States applied different policies, thereby 
reinforcing the differences in the original societal set-up. The reason why it is 
extremely difficult in the long-run to establish any kind of statist co-ordination of 
policy, and especially one which favors social welfare in the U.S. is the 
combination of separation of powers at the center together with federalism. While 
in Sweden the state is centralized and has a unitary nature including major interest 
groups which increased both the knowledge and the drive necessary to run such a 
policy (Weir and Skockpol 1983). Although this is still the case today this example 
shows clearly that there is not one model or convergence in the organization of 
different types of corporatism, but many types also in terms of social and labor 
market policies. 
 
For instance, one study notes a striking difference between macro and micro 
corporatism where the first is exemplified by Sweden (Scandinavia), and the latter 
by Japan and especially Germany. Large companies in these countries are 
supported by a mass of subsidiaries and smaller firms, often relying on cheap and 
non-unionized labor, sometimes bereft of basic labor rights as defined by the ILO 
as in the case of Japan and Germany. Such a society is dual, whereas Scandinavian 
countries in the European context are homogenous. 
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Corporatism in the Scandinavian case is based on cooperation while in the East and 
Southeast Asian case it is based on co-optation and incorporation of various 
institutions especially those associated with the labor market. The question is 
therefore not which instruments the state should use to support Acorporatism 
including labor@, but rather how the state can establish a policy dialogue with 
societal actors. In other words: before anything else, state and societal actors must 
establish new governance structures. This applies to necessary changes internal to 
business associations and trade unions as well as to the establishing of various 
bargaining mechanisms between them. The state has to establish close consultation 
and collaboration within the bureaucracy, and to cut its overly detailed 
interventions into economic and social processes. Societal actors have to establish a 
certain degree of internal cohesion. This is particularly difficult in traditional 
corporatist environments where associations received their mandate from the state 
rather than from their members. Only then will policy agents emerge that aim at 
problem-solving rather than at confrontation or exclusion.  
 
Based on the discussion above it is hard to imagine the general mode of 
>corporatism without labor= in especially Southeast Asia as conducive to an 
emulation of the Scandinavian model. However, recent developments in Korea 
show that this depends very much on the ability of labor to organize and maybe 
even more important to institutionalize a political party which can fight for the 
rights of workers and the type of welfare state best suited to the country due to its 
historical and contextual experience. The old-style corporatism was based on state 
structuring of interest representation though a quasi-representational monopoly. 
What the new style corporatism will be based upon remains to be seen, but below 
some perspectives for Korea and Thailand regarding both social welfare reform and 
labor market reform for the near future are discussed. 
 
Corporatism With or Without Labor? 
Resistance strategies in the region are related to a number of factors: The growing 
unevenness and unequal distribution of wealth; a response based on social and 
democratic rights to the socalled notion of >Asian values=; democratization and the 
social consequences of the crisis. This is evident in all the countries in the region, 
but the case of Korea is singled out as the ATiger@ in terms of the new agenda based 
on labor´s rights which are based on the strength of trade unions. The national 
union centres (KFTU and KCTU) are calling for more proper social security 
systems , but are met with restrictions of the their activities, going so far as to 
imprisonment of trade unionists (in June 1999 61 trade unionists were imprisoned 
for trade union activities) (Gazier and Herrera 2000: 371). 
 
As mentioned above, the Korean labor organization KCTU participated in the 
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tripartite negotiations between the government and business for the first time in 
1998. After years of illegal activities culminating in the famous strikes in 1987 they 
had gained more leverage than the corporate union-based KFTU. Because of 
labor´s strength even in white collar ranks the Apeak bargaining@ can be interpreted 
as labor´s biggest gain ever (Cumings 1999). A victory which might be emulated by 
other trade unions in the region. Although the Arank and file@ membership of the 
KCTU rejected the comprise it is a step in the direction of dialogue and with 
renewed pressure from the World Bank and even the IMF to set up individualized 
social safety nets and unemployment schemes it seems that a ANew Deal@ for South 
Korea is still in a negotiation cum confrontation phase. According to one observer 
the existence of consensus politics can also be interpreted as smoothening and 
facilitating the implementation of neoliberal reforms - thus the rejection of the 
massive lay-offs and wage cuts shows the militancy of the Arank and file@ and now 
even the KFTU has left the tripartite mechanism. However another important point 
is the fact that the Tripartite Commission is increasingly miscredited as the 
development of microelectronics and communications technology made it possible 
for employers to spread production around the globe, undermining any attempt to 
pursue coherent national social and labor policies (Lee 2000: 177-180). Another 
disturbing point for the labor movement in this connection is the still unsolved 
problem with regard to the untapped cheap labor pool in North Korea, which could 
serve as a reserve army pressing wages downwards and thereby curbing prospects 
of a strong and unified labor movement 
 
Summing up and especially based on the Korean example, it is clear that the 
approach of non-welfare by Southeast Asian policy elites is only possible to 
implement if an autocratic political system is in place to restrict the rights of 
individuals, to ban labor rights and to enforce controls of the media. The real 
achievement of such a system is not social security but social control, and the 
unanswered question is whether this option remains the discourse of the elite. The 
practices of the democratically elected government in Korea show that resistance 
against neoliberalism in terms of demands for social reform are met with 
authoritarianism and not social dialogue. One way forward for the KFTU and the 
KCTU is the attempts to improve organizational power of the labor movement by 
promoting collectivism and unity. A situation where enterprise unionism might be 
replaced by industrial unionism is probable in the near future (Lee 2000: 172). 
 
The situation in Thailand differs in a number of ways from the Korean context. Not 
least because the labor movement has less bargaining power, but also because there 
are only modest institutional links between trade unions, peasant movements and 
social movements where the latter seems to be in a forefront battle against the 
impact of globalization. Wage bargaining was, in several instances, in accordance 
with the minimum wage policy implemented under the supervision of the tripartite 
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National Wage Committee. This is another reason explaining why labor union 
activity in Thailand has in a historical perspective been weak and organized labor 
has not before recently been able to significantly influence the public agenda of 
social welfare. The credibility of the officially sanctioned and legally recognized 
national trade union centre is very much eroded now and workers with grievances, 
including members of the official unions, are increasingly looking elsewhere for 
representation. Since recent initiatives to develop independent and democratic trade 
unions have been contained by government repression, workers= organizations are 
forced to operate beyond the ambit of the law and often clandestinely are generally 
unable effectively to openly criticize government policies and programs. (Schmidt 
2000: forthcoming). 
 
However, there are several incidents of wild-cat strikes and one factory has been 
burned to the ground (Sanyo) or occupied (Hara Jeans, Thai Kriang or Century 
Textiles) and in another case female workers forced the boss at a garment factory to 
negotiate. Trade union publications refer to the IMF as seeking to enslave Thailand 
to the West and privatization is often opposed on the grounds that they would be 
sold to foreign capital (Ji Giles 1999: 2 and 12-13). Moving the perspective to the 
role of social movements in the rural areas resistance has been much more 
articulated and militant. According to Somchai (1999: 5), disputes over the rights to 
control the use of land, forests, rivers and water ways, have become the focal point 
of conflicts. More than 2000 conflicts were over natural resources in the 1990s, and 
some of the most militant have taken place at the hydroelectric facility the Pak 
Moon Dam. More than 500 conflicts have been recorded in the Isan area, 81 of 
which have flared into violence (Far Eastern Economic Review August 31, 2000).  
What is of interest in this regard is the fact that many of the conflicts are breaded by 
foreign capital, loans and aid - for instance the Forum of the Poor and the Small 
Scale Farmers Assembly of Isan have established wider linkages with progressive 
fishermen, industrial workers and slum groups in an alliance which is essentially 
struggling against the effects of neoliberalism in a variety of ways.  
 
The economic boom years gave way to all kinds of speculation and an amazing "no 
problem cum repressive" attitude by the Thai economic and political elite. As long 
as the major social contradictions in Thai society could be held at bay by economic 
growth rates and foreign capital democratization and demands for greater 
distribution of resources and social entitlements could not enter the policy agenda. 
After the crisis hit Thai society growing unemployment and its accompanying 
potential social instability might lead to a break with the dominance of Bangkok's 
big business politician alliance and provide space for a genuine political 
representation for the working population - the peasantry and the working class.  
 
Taking further into consideration the fact that the younger urban generation has 
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only recently become aware of poverty and unemployment, another generational 
problem is added to what seems to be emerging in the horizon. The question is 
whether the trade unions and the younger generation in the longer run can accept 
the privatized systems of welfare in East and Southeast Asia which exist in a 
vacuum of a proper system of social security benefits and subsidized health. This is 
further exacerbated by a severe demographic problem consisting of massive 
migration into urban industrial centers, a process which undermines traditional 
forms of social protection. These problems pose a dilemma between hypothetical 
welfare construction and corporate plans, and the traditional stress on familialism 
with its care obligations. 
 
It is probable that the financial crisis and its solution offer some lessons which 
would-be Third World late-developers ought to take seriously. In conclusion it 
might be worth quoting one insider=s view from the worst hit country who says that: 
AToday, instead of turning their attention away from East Asia because of the crisis, 
developing countries may find the region an even more relevant place from which 
to learn about mistakes that should not be repeated (Soesastro 1998: 312). The 
World Bank=s vice-president Jean-Michel Severino´s remarks show that resistance 
against globalization and social chaos in general are the main worries of the Bank: 
AIt is very clear that if the social situation continues to worsen it may reach a point 
at which social unrest might rise and social unrest might itself jeopardize the 
recovery@ (Agence France Presse January 24, 1999). 
 
Resistance by popular movements and to a certain degree labor and peasant 
movements against IMF and the World Bank´s neoliberal market based social and 
labor market reforms has so far prevented the full implementation of austerity. 
Whether real anti-capitalist class struggle will be performed remains to be seen. 
Prospects for collective social reform in the two regions are hampered by the 
government-business alliance=s unwillingness to involve labor in the process of 
policy-making even at its most basic levels (Schmidt: forthcoming). 
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